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S c o t t F. Gilbert

10 Cellular Politics: Ernest Everett
Just, Richard Β. Goldschmidt,
and the Attempt to Reconcile
Embryology and Genetics

Reflecting on embryology in the 1930s, Johannes Holtfreter stated:
We managed more or less successfully to keep our work undisturbed by
humanity's strife and struggle around us and proceeded to study the plants
and animals, and particularly, the secrets of amphibian development.
Here, at least, in the realm of undespoiled Nature, everything seemed
peaceful and in perfect order. It was from our growing intimacy with the
inner harmony, the meaningfulness, the integration, and the interdependence of the structures and functions as we observed them in dumb creatures that we derived our own philosophy of life. It has served us well in
this continuously troublesome world.'
The attempts to reintegrate embryology and genetics during the last years
of the 1930s represent the last chapter in the emergence of American biology.
When had American biology finished "emerging"? I suspect that stage was
reached when it had successfully resisted the last attempts to reintegrate it
into European-dominated traditions of inquiry. For genetics, this occurred in
the late 1930s when Richard B. Goldschmidt and Ernest Everett Just separately countered the American school of genetics with European alternatives.
Goldschmidt and Just both attempted to place genetics into a physiological
framework. Goldschmidt was the director of the genetics section of the Kaiser
Wilhelm Institute before fleeing the Nazis and coming to America in 1936.
For Goldschmidt, the "static genetics" of Τ. H. Morgan, centered on individual particulate genes, was to be replaced by "physiological genetics" wherein
the gene did not exist as an individual unit, and its activity, not its location,
was the focus of research.
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E. E. Just was a black American embryologist who had left America in
1931 to work in Europe. His emphasis on the importance of cytoplasmic factors in heredity was well within the European framework of Carl F. Correns,
Fritz von Wettstein, and Alfred Kühn. For both Goldschmidt and Just, the
relationship between nucleus and cytoplasm became a key issue. For American geneticists, Morgan had used the nuclear envelope as a conceptual and
disciplinary barrier. Geneticists study the transmission of genetic traits within
the nucleus, embryologists study the expression of those traits in the cytoplasm. This division was to allow each discipline to proceed separately. Because European geneticists did not recognize that boundary, the separation
of genetics from embryology did not occur in Europe, where the dominant
perspective of biology came from physiology. Just and Goldschmidt, two
"American" biologists with European affinities, each tried to return American genetics to the physiological traditions. As Just pointed out in 1936, only
when the genes are placed "within the domain of physiology" could "genetics become a branch of biology."

A House Divided
Thomas Hunt Morgan was an embryologist who inadvertently founded the
gene theory in 1911.2 While the Mendelian geneticists had been analyzing the
segregation of characters from one generation to another, Morgan investigated
whether changes in the nuclear composition of an organism affected its development. He began asking this question of ctenophore eggs and sea urchin embryos, and the results convinced him that it was the cytoplasm that controlled
development and inheritance. Through 1910, Morgan remained the major
American critic of the Sutton-Boveri synthesis of Mendelism and cytology.
Only when his Drosophila studies demonstrated that factors for eye color,
body color, wing shape, and sex all segregated with the X-chromosome did
Morgan reluctantly propose the physical linkage of these genetic traits.
The years 1911 to 1915 saw the emergence of a new discipline—genetics.
Although genetics would eventually come to influence all areas of biological
study, the first to feel its effects was its parent discipline, embryology, for the
experimental embryology pioneered by Roux and Weismann in the 1880s saw
the problems of inheritance and development as the same. Even as late as
1910, embryologist Morgan stated, "We have come to look upon the problem
of heredity as identical to the problem of development." 3 However, in the
years following 1910, Morgan drove a wedge into embryology, splitting it into
two divisions comprising the embryologists and the new geneticists.
Geneticists could not develop their own discipline without constructing a
research program separate from that of the rest of the embryologists. To this
end, Morgan employed Wilhelm Johannsen's distinction between genotype
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and phenotype. Johannsen had argued that heredity should only be considered
as the transmission of genetic traits from one generation to another. The emergence of the phenotype was of secondary importance and belonged to the
realm of embryology. Sapp and Allen have shown that Johannsen's distinctions allowed Morgan to shift his attention from the cytoplasmic realm of the
phenotype to that of the nuclear genotype. 4
In the mature formulation of his genetics, The Theory of the Gene, Morgan stated that much unwarranted criticism of genetics had come "from confusing the problems of genetics with those of development." This separation
was extremely important for the emergence of genetics as a new discipline,
and he argued that "the sorting out of characters in successive generations can
be explained at present without reference to the way in which the gene affects
the developmental process." Thus, Morgan had separated the transmission of
hereditary traits (genetics) from the expression of those traits (embryology). 5
Yet Morgan himself never completely abandoned his primary devotion
to embryology, and he returned to active embryological research after he left
Columbia University. Already one year after The Theory of the Gene was
printed, Morgan published Experimental Embryology. These two excellent
textbooks demonstrated Morgan's continued knowledge and expertise in both
areas. Therefore, when his Embryology and Genetics appeared in 1934, those
scientists who desired the resynthesis of the two disciplines had high hopes.
Yet, although this volume provided a survey of both genetics and embryology,
it did not attempt to integrate them. Boris Ephrussi, who was later to play a
major role in such reunifying efforts, recalled his own response.
I said I found the book very interesting, but I thought that the title was
misleading because he did not try to bridge the gap between embryology
and genetics as he had promised in the title. Morgan looked at me with a
smile and said, 'You think the title is misleading! What is the title?' 'Embryology and Genetics,' I said. 'Well,' he asked, 'is not there some embryology and some genetics?' This shows how polarized I was on the gap
between embryology and genetics, and how anxiously I was waiting for
somebody to bridge it.6
Many biologists wished to reconcile the two fields. The small community
of mechanistic biologists felt embarrassed by the widening gap between two
of its most successful disciplines. Speaking of the separate courses taken
by genetics and developmental physiology, F. R. Lillie had remarked that:
"There can be no doubt, I think, that the majority of geneticists, and many
[developmental] physiologists certainly, hope for and expect a reunion. The
spectacle of the biological sciences divided permanently into two camps is
evidently for them too serious a one to be regarded with satisfaction." 7
However, after mentioning various attempts to reconcile the two fields,
Lillie pessimistically concluded that developmental physiology and genetics
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must remain separate. "Those who desire to make genetics the basis of physiology of development will have to explain how an unchanging complex can
direct the course of an ordered developmental stream. . . . The dilemma at
which we have arrived appears to be irresolvable at present."
Like many embryologists, Lillie had good reason for being suspicious of
genetics as an explanation for development. First, as the quotation illustrates,
the chromosomal repertoire was believed by geneticists to be constant in every
cell. Yet development was defined by cellular change. "It would, therefore,
appear to be self-contradictory to attempt to explain embryonic segregation by
behavior of genes which are ex-hype the same in every cell." Second, heredity was perceived to be controlled by nuclear chromosomes. Development on
the other hand was manifest in the cytoplasm. As Lillie stated, "The germ
exhibits the duality of nucleus and cytoplasm; the geneticist has taken the former for his field, the embryologist the latter." 8
Differentiation was seen as caused by intercellular relationships (a cell becoming a different structure when placed in a different part of an embryo), and
such relationships were "mediated through the cytoplasm, not through the nucleus." Lillie thought that the genes constituted the basis of a physiological
reaction system to the environment but were not responsible for specifying
particular developmental characteristics.
These were the points that Morgan failed to address in his 1934 book. Indeed, the synthesis had not progressed very far in the seven years since Lillie's
essay. Morgan noted that "the interlocking of these two has become a subject
of absorbing interest" and that his book would attempt to "point out in a
simple way their interrelations." However, Morgan's goals were actually more
superficial. He was not so much interested in discussing "interrelations" as he
was "points of contact." The latter was Morgan's own metaphor and aptly
described his views. 9 Throughout this book, Morgan portrayed the two disciplines as exclusive spheres touching at a common point. This "common meeting place of embryology and genetics was found in the relationship between
the hereditary units in the chromosomes, the genes, and the protoplasm of the
cell where the influence of the genes comes to visible expression." This relationship was expressed simply: "The initial differences in the protoplasmic
regions may be supposed to affect the activity of the genes. The genes will
then in turn affect the protoplasm, which will start a new series of reciprocal
reactions. In this way, we can picture to ourselves the gradual elaboration and
differentiation of the various regions of the embryo." 1 0
This framework of nucleocytoplasmic interaction was not new but was an
updating of Hans Driesch's classic embryological statement from 1894." Furthermore, Morgan could offer no direct experimental evidence in favor of this
hypothesis, and he returned to explanations used at the turn of the century by
E. B. Wilson to explain the nuclear role in programming the cytoplasm. Thus,
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Morgan's analysis of sinistral coiling of the snail's shell—the only developmental mutant discussed in his book—is almost identical to Wilson's analysis
of molluscan development in 1894 and 1904. Some material is postulated to
pass from the nucleus to become active in the cytoplasm. In the case of snail
coiling, the gene is active in the production of the oocyte cytoplasm itself.
Although Morgan's book is generally a review of the two divergent disciplines, he did present a new and very liberal interpretation of the gene. The
two fundamental properties of such a unit, he wrote, were its power to grow
and divide and its power to cause changes in the chemical and physical nature
of the cytoplasm. The evidence for the former rested on the cytological demonstration of chromosomal replication, whereas the evidence for the latter, admittedly circumstantial, was that changes in hereditary characteristics can be
traced back to particular loci on particular chromosomes. He did not hold to
the view of "genie balance"—that is, that all the genes are active in every cell
and that the phenotype is the summed product of all the individual influences.
In that view, a mutation or environmental assault would perturb this equilibrium in one way or another. This concept had the advantage of fitting into
current models of general physiology and homeostasis, and many embryologists (such as Lillie) tended to assume it. Morgan, however, thought that this
view was "quite inadequate to explain the sequence of changes through which
the embryo passes." Morgan also did not believe that "different batteries of
genes come into action as development proceeds," for this was inconsistent
with Driesch's data wherein nuclei given different positions in the embryo directed the differentiation in accord with their new locations. So Morgan did
not propose any mechanism for differentiation that would work according to
his model of nucleocytoplasmic interaction. However, the last page of this
book suggests that the nuclear genes may not be the unchangeable entities that
geneticists had (and until very recently still have) assumed. "It is, however,
conceivable that the genes also are building up more and more, or are changing in some way, as development proceeds in response to that part of the protoplasm in which they come to lie, and that these changes have a reciprocal
influence on the protoplasm." 12 Morgan's refusal to integrate genetics and embryology and his extremely flexible, even epigenetic, view of the gene opened
the way for others to attempt the synthesis.

The Rival Professions
Although embryologists in the 1920s generally hoped that genetics would return to the fold, by the mid 1930s many embryologists were reacting against
the new genetics. The geneticists had become too successful. Jan Sapp, and
Diane Paul and Barbara Kimmelman (this volume) show that with the interest
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in applied breeding techniques (in both animal husbandry, plant breeding, and
eugenics), genetics quickly asserted itself as the premier biological science in
America. The years from 1915 to 1932 were characterized by "the establishment of university chairs of genetics; by the founding of an academic journal,
Genetics . . . and by the emergence of a purely academic genetics society,
quite separate from the American Genetics Association. The Genetics Society
of America was founded in 1932."13
The geneticists believed they had mastered the mechanisms of chromosome transmission and were now looking in the direction of gene expression.14 Expression, of course, is epigenetic development and had been left
to the embryologists to unravel. But the embryologists had their own set
of problems and interests, and entering the nuclear realm to identify the
products of these so-called genes was not one of them. The organizer experiments from Hans Spemann's laboratory, the intercellular gradient theories of
C. M. Child, the intracellular gradients discovered by J. Runnstrom and Sven
Hörstadius, the limb development fields of R. G. Harrison, and the pluripotency of neural crest cells shown by Benjamin Willier and Mary Rawles
were fascinating phenomena worthy of any embryologist's attention. Thus, a
few geneticists started to venture into the realm of gene expression. Most notably, Ephrussi and G. W. Beadle began their analysis of the genetic control of
the development of eye pigment.' 5
In 1936, two years after Morgan's book, a joint session of the American
Society of Zoologists, the American Society of Naturalists, and the Genetic
Society of America was conducted on "Genetics and Development." Like
Morgan's book before, the discussions had some genetics and some development, but there was little "crossover." The discussants were E. E. Just, E. W.
Sinnott, G. W. Beadle, and V. C. Twitty. Just began his lecture by limiting his
discussion to the embryological events of fertilization and cleavage as if those
were the only embryonic stages where such a discussion was possible. "In
discussing the phenomena of the process of animal embryogenesis . . . from
which we may attempt to derive a theory of development and heredity, I must
obviously limit myself to those changes that take place before the embryo is
delineated." 16 He relegated Mendelian nuclear characters to secondary status
as those finishing touches occurring after the cytoplasm had built the basis of
the embryo, and he argued that neither nucleus nor cytoplasm, alone, is a
functioning biological entity. Sinnott noted that it was impossible to know
how a gene controlled something until one had learned what a gene controlled. His lecture, on the genetic control of shape in gourds and melons,
concentrated on the problem of allometric growth. Beadle reviewed the inheritance of eye color in Drosophila, showing that diffusible substances involved in pigment production are deficient in certain mutants. Last, Twitty
summarized the genetics of pigment pattern in salamanders. Here, inter-
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specific hybrids and grafts showed that both the egg and sperm influence pigment development and distribution.
Not only was there no agreement among the speakers, but the embryologists were hostile to the notion that genetics and embryology might be two
approaches to study the same phenomenon. Harrison, in his review of the session, noted that "the embryologist . . . is more concerned with the larger
changes in the whole organism and its primitive systems of organs than with
the lesser qualities associated with gene action." Just put it more succinctly,
stating that he was more interested in how the embryo made a back than in the
formation of the bristles on the back and more interested in the developmental
construction of the eye than in the synthesis of eye pigments. 17
Immediately after this session, Harrison, as outgoing chairman of the section on zoological sciences of the American Association for the Advancement
of Science, presented a lecture on "Embryology and Its Relations." It is obvious that he did not think that the realms of embryology and genetics were
coextensive, and he wanted to keep the geneticists on their own turf.
Now that the necessity of relating the data of genetics to embryology is
generally recognized and the "Wanderlust" of geneticists is beginning to
urge them in our direction, it may not be inappropriate to point out a danger in this threatened invasion.
The prestige of success enjoyed by the gene theory might easily become a hindrance to the understanding of development by directing our
attention solely to the genom, whereas cell movements, differentiation, and
in fact all developmental processes are actually effected by the cytoplasm. 18
Harrison was not alone in his fears for embryology. N. J. Berrill, one of
the founders of the Growth Symposium that later became the Developmental
Biology Society, recently characterized the geneticists of the 1930s as "marauding intruders." 19 He likened their behavior to that of a corporation that
aggressively subsumed other companies. "The geneticists," he said, "felt
that they had all the answers, and all my life, they've been pushing." Berrill
should know, because he had to defend embryology at McGill University
against the encroachments by geneticist C. L. Huskins. Huskins wanted to
unite the zoology, botany, and genetics departments with genetics on top.
This fight was synecdochical for the larger battle, for it was largely one
of methodological orthodoxy versus methodological pluralism. The geneticists claimed that development could be approached as an epiphenomenon of
genetic control and therefore that genetics could best obtain the answers to
developmental questions. In fact, all biology was seen as epiphenomenal of
the genetic processes, so it was natural for them to assert that genetics should
be primary. For embryologists, however, developmental biology was a collection of problems. Genetics was only one approach of many. When one looks
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at the roster of speakers at the first Growth Society meetings in 1939, one is
impressed by the different perspectives represented. 20 Warren Lewis discussed
tissue culture techniques, J. Needham spoke on the biochemistry of the organizer, Oscar Schotte's talk dealt with regeneration, and E. W. Sinnott presented material on plant morphogenesis. Papers by P. W. Gregory and Otto
Glaser concerned growth and size relationships, while papers by Curt Stern
and C. H. Waddington separately discussed the role of genes in development.
There was even a philosopher, J. H. Woodger, to close the session.
The embryologists celebrated this heterogeneity. Berrill was delighted
that "representatives of the field [s] of agriculture, bacteriology, biochemistry,
biophysics, botany, cytology, embryology, endocrinology, genetics, histology, mathematics, pathology, philosophy, physiology, and zoology concentrated on a single issue, and considerable correlation and conceptual
integration was accomplished." 21 The single issue was, of course, development, and the listing of subjects was pluralistically alphabetical.
The American embryologists saw embryology and genetics as two intersecting spheres, one representing embryology, gene expression, phenotype,
and the cytoplasm, and the other representing genetics, gene transmission,
genotype, and the nucleus. However, the geneticists (who had originally established those boundaries) were beginning to see the spheres as enclosing the
same domains, and genetics and embryology as simply two approaches to the
same subject. Moreover, they believed that the genetic approach was superior
to any other. As long as the geneticists confined their activities to those within
the nucleus, the embryologists felt secure. It was only when the geneticists
sought to cross the nuclear envelope into the cytoplasm that the embryologists
became worried.
In Europe, the boundary of the nuclear membrane had never been formalized. The German school of genetics, never greatly interested in the gene
localization program of Morgan's school, had been focusing since the early
1920s on the physiology of gene expression. However, as Harwood has shown,
the German geneticists were split between those who accorded the nuclear
genome absolute authority over cellular functions (a theory called Kernmonopol by its detractors) and those scientists who saw the cytoplasm as having an
equal, if complementary, role in directing development. The advocates of
Kernmonopol referred to the supremacy ( Überlegenheit) of the nucleus and
its dominating role {dominierende Rolle) in development. As one such advocate warned, if the cytoplasm contained hereditary determinants, "then the
gene would be dethroned ( beherrschenden Platz entthront) from its position
of controlling development and evolution and would be forced to assume a
secondary role." 2 2
During the 1920s and 1930s, however, many geneticists, such as Correns,
von Wettstein, and Kühn, criticized this notion, claiming that the structure of
the cytoplasm carried genetic potentials as well. In an analogy that would
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be extended by both von Wettstein and Just, the geneticist H. Nachtsheim
noted that "the plasma is the building material (Baumaterial) for the chromosomes" and that the type of chromosome could be influenced by the type
of cytoplasm contained in the cell. 23 Although the center stage of genetics and
development was occupied by English-speaking scientists, the German controversies remained very important, for both Just and Goldschmidt grounded
their respective theories in this soil. As in America, there appeared to be little
discussion in Germany between the embryologists and the geneticists. 24 However, in Europe, the embryologists were paramount, and the geneticists were
the ones struggling to make inroads.
In America, genetics had been remarkably successful and was starting to
enter where the Europeans had long been theorizing, into the realm of gene
expression. Here, the boundaries had been firmly demarcated. "The cytoplasm may be ignored genetically," Morgan had declared in 1926; but just as
Morgan had chased his embryological problems into the nucleus, so the geneticists were chasing their problems right back into the cytoplasm. 25 In so
doing, the geneticists laid claim to embryology.
In any union or reunion of disciplines, the problem of professional hierarchy becomes acute. If the geneticists were content to study the stable nuclear
genotype and the embryologists were satisfied to study the emergence of the
changing cytoplasmic phenotype, all would be well. Each field could develop
(or evolve) on its own. However, if the subject matter of embryology and genetics was actually the same (as in a resynthesis of the two fields), who was
best suited to study such a united field, the geneticists or the embryologists?
The relationship between the nucleus and the cytoplasm became critical in
these discussions because of an implicit analogy: Genetics is to embryology
as the nucleus is to the cytoplasm. If the nucleus were seen to control the
cytoplasmic phenotype, then the geneticists would have the right to guide the
field. Conversely, if the potentials for development were cytoplasmically located, the nucleus (and the geneticists) would play a subservient role. Given
the boldly assertive nature of the newly organized geneticists, the embryologists, not surprisingly, tried to show that the fields were not coextensive,
whereas the geneticists pushed for a synthesis. The implicit professional analogy between nucleus and cytoplasm should be remembered whenever such
syntheses are being proposed, for the nucleus and cytoplasm became code
words for genetics and embryology, respectively.
By 1938, genetics and embryology remained separate disciplines. While
the geneticists were formulating a genetic approach to development, embryologists persisted in ignoring new ideas in genetics. Thus, Spemann's
enormously influential book Embryonic Development and Induction (1938)
completely ignored all of genetics. His only acknowledgment of the significance of the nucleus was his notion that nuclear transplantation experiments
might show whether Weismann's view of nuclear determination was correct. 26
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Similarly, Paul Weiss's important embryology textbook Principles of Development relegated genetics to a single footnote saying that Curt Stern had seen
"striking correlations between chromosomal aberrations and the morphology
of the mutant cells [which] indicate a nuclear foundation of differentiation
potencies." 27
The remainder of this essay will study two syntheses of embryology and
genetics that were published in 1938 and 1940. These attempts at reunion, published respectively by geneticist Richard Benedict Goldschmidt (1878-1958)
and embryologist Ernest Everett Just (1883-1941) were also attempts to reunite (or subjugate) American genetics into the matrix of German biology.
They represented the two poles of continental thinking on genetics and embryology. In rejecting this reintegration, American biology demonstrated its
independence from Europe.

The Outsiders: R. B. Goldschmidt and E. E. Just
In America in 1938, the breach between embryology and genetics had not
been healed, and not everybody sought such a reunion. Yet in the next two
years, four major volumes attempted a reunion of the two disciplines. Two
books, authored by E. E. Just and Richard B. Goldschmidt, were considered
as mature statements of their respective authors. Goldschmidt's Physiological
Genetics sought to subsume development into a large framework of genetics.
Indeed, development was seen as the epiphenomenon of activities directed by
nuclear genes. Just's The Biology of the Cell Surface belittled the role of the
genes, giving them minor roles to play in the essentially cytoplasmic process
of development.
In 1938 both Just and Goldschmidt were in similar positions. Both were
cultured, sophisticated, and arrogantly proud men who had been exiled from
their homelands and from their disciplines. Goldschmidt was a German citizen of Jewish descent working in America because of the genocidal policies of
the Third Reich. Just, conversely, was a black American who felt forced to
work in Europe because of racial discrimination in American universities.
By 1938, Goldschmidt had already alienated himself from the majority of
geneticists with a series of increasingly serious breaks with the genetic "orthodoxy" of the Morgan School. First, Goldschmidt had disagreed with the
simple chromosomal genetics of sex determination espoused by Morgan,
Bridges, and Sturtevant, preferring instead the physiological approach of the
German school that he had helped lead. Reflecting on his lectures at Woods
Hole in 1915, Goldschmidt wrote that only Jacques Loeb, a physiologist,
"understood the significance of my work in trying to bring dynamic viewpoints into genetics." 28
Second, Goldschmidt denigrated the basis of the grand synthesis of ge-
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netics and evolution into neo-Darwinism. (He later claimed that he was a
neo-Darwinian before neo-Darwinism and saw its flaws as the others were
adopting it.) Crucial to this synthesis was the belief that the gradual accumulation of small mutations led to distinct species. There was no qualitative difference in the genetic mechanisms that produce races, species, or higher taxa.
However, by the mid-1930s, Goldschmidt was claiming that microevolution
(the evolutionary changes within species) and macroevolution (the origin of
divergent species and higher taxa) were caused by different mechanisms. The
synthesis of Mendelism and Darwinism could explain microevolution, but the
current genetic theories could not explain the creation of new species. He now
suggested that species differences might arise either by "macromutations" involving chromosome structure or by regulatory mutations early in development—processes very different from the structural gene mutations then
known by geneticists. To make matters more difficult for himself, he grouped
natural selection and special creation together as "extreme suppositions," neither of which contains the whole truth.29
Third, Goldschmidt disagreed with the very corpuscular nature of the
gene itself. He interpreted the recent papers of J. Schultz, Β. Glass, and N. P.
Dubinin as indicating that the presence of a portion of the chromosome did not
determine whether or not it is optimally active. Rather its position within the
chromosomal complex determined its activity. This position-effect phenomenon could not be explained by classical genetics and allowed Goldschmidt to
postulate "a theory of the germ plasm in which the individual genes as separate units will no longer exist." 30 Moreover, whereas most of his colleagues
were interested in the transmission of hereditary factors, Goldschmidt concentrated on their expression.
Goldschmidt had indeed "struck a hornets' nest" in the United States.
The Neo-Darwinians' counterattack succeeded in burying his work for nearly
fifty years. Gould has reported on the depth of this neglect, stating that Goldschmidt "suffered the worst fate of all: to be ridiculed and unread." 3 ' Elsewhere, Gould has compared Goldschmidt to Orwell's Goldstein, the object of
the daily two-minute hate sessions in 1984.n Certainly by 1938, Goldschmidt
was an outsider both to his field and to his country.
Goldschmidt was, in one important sense, much more fortunate than Just.
Neither of them could aspire to the heights of the career they had entered.
Goldschmidt made most of his reputation while working as Richard Hertwig's
assistant, and he could never hope to get a tenured position in a university
even though he essentially ran Hertwig's laboratory and taught Hertwig's
courses. "A number of times my name had been in the running, but in every
case academic anti-Semitism had decided against me. Thus I longed to get
away from the university into a pure research position. But there was none
in Germany, and I had to resign myself." 33 Goldschmidt was not wrong in
his assessment, as T. J. Horder and P. J. Weindling have shown.34 In 1914

322

Scott F. Gilbert

Theodor Boveri, the premier cytologist in Europe, wrote to his former student, Hans Spemann, telling him he disliked Goldschmidt's face and he
did not want yet another Jew to become a director of a Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute. However, when the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Biology was founded
in Berlin, the president of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Society, theologian Adolf
Harnack, made it clear that religion would not play a role in the selection of
the department directors. Thus, Goldschmidt escaped the Prussian university
system to become a division director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Biology in 1913.
Just's appointment to Howard University was not an escape from the
throes of American racial antagonisms. As Kenneth Manning has shown in his
excellent biography of Just, Howard University abused their star biologist. 35
Just was graduated from Dartmouth College with honors in both biology and
English. Howard was the only place in the country where a black scientist had
a chance to rise to any position of responsibility and power, and Just reached
this "height" as soon as he left college. After that, the administration of Howard withheld funds that Just had raised, gave him enormous teaching assignments, and made certain that he could not go anywhere else. By working at
Woods Hole and University of Chicago, Just received his doctorate under
Frank Lillie; but still, there was no other place in America where Just could
pursue his work. Earlier, Just had gone to Dohrn's Stazione Zoologica in
Naples, and in 1930 he decided to leave America permanently. His work on
fertilization and parthenogenesis in marine organisms was appreciated more
in Europe than in America, and he was unable to get funds to continue his
work in his native land. Unfortunately, Just's timing could not have been
worse, for Mussolini was in the process of nationalizing the scientific enterprises in Italy, and Just was interned briefly as an enemy alien. The Biology of
the Cell Surface, the culmination of Just's biological theories, was written in
Paris, away from both homes, America and Italy. Just's work, like that of
Goldschmidt's, met with polite neglect. Although his 1931 paper in Naturwissenschaften36 had provided the first evidence for functional changes in the
cell surface during development, it was all but ignored, and even when cited
(as in Heilbrun's books), it was not discussed. When research on the cell surface began again after World War II, Just's work was quickly forgotten. 37
Manning's biography of Just chronicles the hardships that a competent
black American scientist met in securing employment, respect, and funds during the first half of this century. Yet one of the best expressions of the outsider's education comes from Goldschmidt, himself, and probably holds
equally true for the sensitive, self-confident black American scientist.
I think, actually, that nobody has a better chance to see the ugly side of
human nature than an intellectual Jew who has succeeded in life. Thinking
of the innumerable instances when I was stabbed in the back by those who
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breathed deference in my face, fellows intellectually and morally below
me, I am surprised that I am not a pessimist. No doubt, this thorn in my
flesh has had an immense influence in shaping my character. It has made
me cautious and remote, unwilling to show the warmth of my nature unless I know the other man thoroughly. It has taught me to look through
people and to analyze them. It has forced me to learn to control my temper, to appear quiet on the surface when I am burning, to appear distant
when I long for friendship, to develop self-observation and self-control to
a perfection—all of which is frequently misinterpreted as coolness or
haughtiness. It has also produced an unnecessarily deep contempt for the
second-rater, the go-getter, the social peacock, and clubman. And it certainly killed a number of qualities that I otherwise would have developed,
qualities I consciously forced into the background because I knew that
their development would expose me to slights and hatred that my soul was
not sufficiently robust to drop off lightly. What is the use of aspiring to
leadership of men if every half-wit, scoundrel, or Philistine can knock you
out with the single word 'Jew'? 3 8
Just was never fully accepted by the American embryological community
(and, as Pauly shows in this volume, at Woods Hole, it was indeed a community), and he burned his bridges to America when, in 1930, he walked out of
the Marine Biological Laboratory's (MBL) tribute to Lillie, saying that he had
known more collegiality during one year in Europe than during all his time
at the MBL. 39
But Just was an outsider to embryology for other reasons as well. His contemporaries did not think his research was important, and experimental embryology had left Just behind. The heated debates between Loeb and Lillie
over fertilization had all but been forgotten in the 1930s. Textbooks paid no
account to what had been a dramatic struggle twenty years before. There was
enormous excitement in embryology, and this excitement had moved from
fertilization to embryonic determination. This was the era of the great transplantations. By reciprocal transplantation Spemann had demonstrated the importance of gastrulation in determining embryonic cell fate, and he and Hilde
Mangold capped those experiments by showing the existence of the "primary
embryonic organizer." Hörstadius recombined different tiers of sea urchin
blastomeres to discover gradients of preformed substances that informed those
cells how to develop, and Harrison transplanted salamander limbs in different
positions to discover the laws by which organisms retained their polarity. Niu,
Twitty, and Willier (the last mentioned having begun his graduate work under
Lillie in the same year Just received his doctorate) discovered the ways in
which neural crest cells migrate and differentiate, and Weiss investigated the
ways in which neurons migrate to their target tissue. A new research program
had been established, one that Joseph Needham has christened "Gestaltungsgesetze, the rules of morphological order." 40

324

Scott F. Gilbert

Whereas neither Lillie nor Loeb was working on fertilization after 1920,
Just continued studying these same problems of fertilization and was still
using the older, less invasive techniques. His work and his methods, though
still scientifically valid, had "gone out of fashion." Why was this the case?
Just's retention of old methods and problems has many explanations. One
explanation focuses on his professional responsibilities. 41 Other investigators
at Woods Hole often had two research interests, one that they pursued during
the summer (when the embryos abounded at the MBL) and another that they
pursued during the school year while landlocked and cold. Due to his teaching
responsibilities, Just could pursue research only in the summer and was denied the chances to work on other lines of inquiry. Similarly, other investigators had a regular influx of graduate students, who could stimulate new
research ideas and keep their advisors up to date. Just had neither collaborators nor a flow of new graduate students to spur him into newer areas. Another
explanation is that Just's research plan was still a viable part of European, if
not American, biology. Starting in 1930, many of Just's papers were sent to
German journals, such as Protoplasma, that were more sympathetic to the
role of cytoplasmic factors in development.
There are other explanations, too. Just was a perfectionist who did not like
to leave a problem unsolved. The importance of the cortical cytoplasm during
fertilization had been suggested by Lillie and documented by Just. Just did not
want to leave the field until he had established incontrovertible proof that this
was the case. Also, Just felt a respect and sense of loyalty to Lillie. He had
cast himself as Lillie's "bulldog" against Loeb, and he was fighting his mentor's cause. There may still be another reason. As we shall see, Just "identified" himself with the cortical cytoplasm. Most biologists conceived of the
cytoplasm as being dominated by the nucleus and merely responsive to its demands. The cortical cytoplasm was ignored by almost every biologist, some
of whom thought that it was not even a living part of the cell. It was indeed
ignored by embryologists and spurned by geneticists. To Just, the cortical
cytoplasm was the most exciting part of the cell, guiding all intercellular communication, controlling cell functions, regulating early development, and
serving as the vanguard of animal evolution. The nervous system of humanity,
he claimed, was derived from the cortical cytoplasm. As I will try to show
hereafter, Just was to fight the benign neglect of the cell periphery. Just identified with the cause of the cortical cytoplasm and in fighting its cause was
fighting his own. Just's use of the cell as a model of society will become explicit in this essay.
Thus, these two syntheses of embryology and genetics, published in the
late 1930s, were both written at a time when their respective authors were
living in exile from their homeland and scientific communities. Yet two books
having the same synthetic goal could hardly be more different. There is but
one reference (Lillie's 1927 paper wherein he despairs of synthesis) in com-
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mon between the two books. Just's book concentrates on those embryological
phenomena manifested by cytoplasmic changes during the early development
of marine invertebrates, whereas Goldschmidt 's volume focuses on those later
stages of insect development that he can prove to be under genetic control.
As Just had said earlier, he was himself more interested in the back than the
bristles on the back. Goldschmidt, however, delighted in bristles and wing
hairs, and felt that they were just as much a product of development as any
other structure.42
The Biology of the Cell Surface and Physiological Genetics are intensely
personal books, each reflecting the idiosyncratic positions of its respective author.43 Just and Goldschmidt used their books to promote a view of development at odds with those of their peers, and in doing so, each man quoted
nearly his entire scientific corpus. Both represent attempts of two highly original scientists to integrate what they considered to be the important data on the
awesome problem of how an organism is constructed from a fertilized egg.
Both seek to place American genetics into the German type of developmental
physiology. I propose to discuss these two books on three levels: first, as
straight scientific texts (as their respective authors no doubt intended them
to be read); second, as professional texts involving partisan claim-staking by
two rival professional groups both seeking to study the same phenomenon;
and third, as political texts, inasmuch as there is an implicit metaphor between
the proper nuclear regulation during development and the proper action of a
central governing body in a society. The relationship of the nucleus to the
cytoplasm established in the scientific text becomes the way in which the relationship of genetics to embryology is seen in the professional text and the relationship that a central government bears to its people in the political text.

The Cellular Federalism of E. E. J u s t
The Biology of the Cell Surface was an attack on the mechanistic and reductionist view of development promulgated by the geneticists on the one hand
and the biochemists on the other. Just's work attempted to accomplish two
tasks thought to be mutually exclusive. First, it sought to counter the genetic
mechanistic view with a cellular holism. To this end, Just redefined the scientific vocabulary used to describe developmental phenomena and elevated the
cytoplasm at the expense of the nucleus. Second, it tried to integrate genetics
and embryology, as both the nucleus and the cytoplasm played necessary roles
in cell differentiation. In this synthesis, Just posited that all the potentials for
development were present in the cytoplasm, and gave the nucleus a necessary,
but secondary function.
Just began his book with a seventy-four page defense of cellular holism
against the reductionist research programs of the geneticists and biochemists
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of the 1930s. His view of the cell as the irreducible unit of life was expressed
on the title page in a verse from Goethe containing a remarkably apt pun.
Natur hat weder Kern
Noch Schale,
Alles ist sie mit einemmale. 44
The noun Kern, translated here as kernel (inasmuch as Goethe's analogy is
that of a fruit), also possesses the cytological meaning of cell nucleus. This
unity of the cell was to be the hallmark of Just's book. Therefore, he attacked
the radical separation of nucleus from cytoplasm and the supposed hegemony
of the nucleus over the other regions of the cell.
In general, the organization of living matter, that is, of protoplasm, appears as consisting of two components, a nuclear and a cytoplasmic. Although most often these are set off as two distinct regions, as a sphere
(nucleus) within a sphere (cytoplasm), this sharp differentiation is not invariable. For several reasons, as will be shown beyond, much of modern
biological investigation has centered upon the nuclear component as
though it were indeed the kernel of life. Not only has the cytoplasmic
component been relatively neglected but also have those protoplasmic systems which lack sharply defined and set-off nuclei received scant attention. . . . Because of the rapid rise of genetics, hegemony in the
protoplasmic organization has been ascribed to the chromosomal structure
of the nucleus and the cytoplasm has been subordinated as though it be
a mere protective and nutritive shell. It is no part of the purpose of this
book to minimize the achievements of genetics and the investigations on
chromosome-structure, all outgrowths of descriptive studies on protoplasmic organization. Instead, inasmuch as life, as we know it so far, resides in the whole system, the pages which follow aim to show how far
life-processes are related to the dual and reciprocal components, nuclear
and cytoplasmic structure. 45
Just's critique of genetics was similar to that of other embryologists such
as Harrison and Lillie. He was willing to accept the chromosomal theory of
inheritance but could not see the unchanging chromosomes directing embryogenesis. First, he did not see how a chemical gene could persist intact
throughout numerous cell divisions. Having no concept of molecular replication in his mind, he supposed that if a gene were a molecule controlling development, it must become half a molecule after the first cell division and a
quarter-molecule after the second cleavage. Second, he followed Lillie and
Harrison in asking: "How could genes be responsible for differentiation, if
they are the same in every cell?" Not averse to using ridicule, Just chided
geneticists such as Demerec who had recently spoken on the embryologist's
home turf, Woods Hole: "Untutored savage man made his god as big as pos-
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sible because his god could do everything. It remained for the geneticists to
make one of molecular size, the gene. Here obviously infinite minuteness
means infinite capacity. According to one geneticist Demerec, the gene has
almost magic power. Here is physico-chemical biology with a vengeance." 44
Having disposed of the genetic theory of development, Just elevated the
roles of the cytoplasm. He did this in two approaches. First, he redefined the
terms of cell biology, which he thought had been warped by genetics. Second,
he summarized the scientific evidence for the importance of the cytoplasm for
developmental regulation. Just was extremely concerned with the precision of
the scientific language, and of the sociological function of language. He alluded to the relationship between language and professionalization, saying
that the last thirty years had seen genetics "develop almost to the proportions
of a separate science—at least it has a very rich vocabulary of its own." In
his next paragraph, Just would use his own rhetorical devices to exclude
geneticists not only from embryology, but from the entire science. Here, he
contrasted geneticists who accepted the gene theory of development with "biologists, on the other hand," who harbored doubts. 47
The Biology of the Cell Surface is full of carefully phrased redefinitions.
Just redefined such terms as cytoplasm, cell membrane, life, fertilization, and
cell division in a context of embryological holism and against genetic reductionism. For instance, he described in detail the events of fertilization in four
species of marine invertebrates to demonstrate that "the fertilization-process
in these four examples resolves itself into two phases—an external, that concerns the ectoplasm, and an internal, that concerns the nuclei." After demonstrating that the binding of sperm and egg is a complete, well-orchestrated
phenomenon involving adjacent cell surfaces and that in some experimental
(parthenogenesis) and natural (Rhabditis) instances, fertilization occurs without nuclear fusion, Just concluded: "To retain the old definition of fertilization as the union of egg and sperm-nucleus is to violate both fact and logic."
Similarly, Just found that "common usage has been loose in giving the term,
cell division, the meaning of the division of the nucleus." After demonstrating numerous cases where cells divide without mitotic figures and where
nuclei divide without cell division (as in early insect eggs), he stated, "It
becomes obvious in the light of what has been said that nuclear and cytoplasmic division are separate phenomena. . . . Cell division is to be defined as
the division of the cell body. . . . Finding it impossible to relate division
of the cytoplasmic mass to the nucleus, we turn to the cytoplasm itself."4®
As firm as Just was against nuclear "hegemony," he was equally hard on
those who he thought misrepresented the cytoplasm. Foremost among these
malefactors were the biochemists who sought to explain embryogenesis by
breaking embryos apart and measuring chemical reactions. Needham's epic
Biochemical Embryology had just been published in 1931, complete with a
magisterial historical prologue giving the new biochemical methodology a
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classical pedigree. Just belittled those activities and, in a metaphor linking
biochemistry with colonialism, depicted biochemists as conducting "punitive
expeditions against the egg." Moreover, Just was adamant against using life
as a means and not an end in itself. "The cell is never a tool. . . . Living
matter is never an excuse and living phenomena never an opportunity for the
display of the investigator's physico-chemical knowledge." 4 9
Just sought the mystery of life, not its mastery. 50 This attitude was more
akin to the naturalist than to the experimental embryologist of the 1930s. Indeed, Just's approach was very much that of the naturalist, making detailed
observations without perturbing his organisms experimentally. Throughout
The Biology of the Cell Surface, he criticized those modern researchers who
experimented on organisms that are already damaged and who manipulated
them so harshly that no value could be attached to their results. This lack of
care, he believed, was due to a lack of respect for living phenomena. "Scientists degrade eggs by calling them 'material.' They do not respect their specimen, nor do they respect the integrity of life." Rather, "those experiments
which alter a normal process the least have today especially great value in the
study of the egg and its development. . . . By experiment we here slightly
exaggerate, there lightly fret the tones out of which the harmony of the living
state arises." 51 This approach is a far cry from the major embryological research program of the 1930s, which was characterized as dissecting the whole
into smaller and smaller parts "quite heedless as to how far analysis into the
nonvital may be possible." 52
This brings us to the main thrust of Just's book, his experiments showing
the importance of the cell cortex in development. Just began his analysis of
the cell surface with a review of fertilization. What interested Just was not the
movements of the nuclei or even the rearrangements of the cytoplasm that are
so evident during fertilization, but the immediate effects brought about by the
attachment of sperm and egg. To Just, all the other effects are secondary to the
real drama that was occurring at the egg cell surface. To observe these events,
some of which take place in a matter of seconds, requires persistent and careful observation of the most perfectly normal eggs. If the eggs were damaged,
any conclusions that might be drawn from them were useless, and an observer
who was not careful and persistent would likely dismiss the small transient
events as meaningless.
Just's first paper, in 1912, established his reputation as a meticulous observer of natural phenomena. Here, Just demonstrated that the plane of the
first cleavage of Nereis eggs is determined by the point of sperm entry. 53 This
observation implied that the particular point of the cell surface that bound the
sperm played a decisive role in the future development of the organism. For
the next eight years, Just focused his research on detailed observations of the
fertilization reaction in marine organisms. In 1915, he published another paper
on the fertilization reaction of Nereis, which supported the work of his men-
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tor, Frank Lillie, against that of Loeb. The debate between Lillie and Loeb
over the nature of fertilization had been heated for several years, and Just's
research added more strength to Lillie's model. What is striking in the rhetoric
of this 1915 report is that Just supported his case by using Loeb's own words
against their original author. 54 Just's literary technique is in marked contrast to
the style of Lillie's own paper (published next to Just's in the same volume),
which is a detailed rebuttal of Loeb couched in the most polite and carefully
phrased language. It is no mystery why Loeb (and his students) developed an
antagonism to this brash newcomer to their field.55
Unlike most researchers of his era, Just held that "fertilization is essentially a process of the egg." The sperm was secondary and, in some species,
eliminated. Just's major support for this view came in 1919 when he published
two papers on sea urchin fertilization. In the first paper, he dissected the initial
minute of fertilization into a series of reactions on the egg surface. First, the
sperm did not bore its way into the egg; rather the egg pulled it in. About ten
seconds thereafter, a blister formed at the point of sperm entry. Droplets
dispersed from this point, and the membrane that had been glued to the egg
surface began to peel off. Moreover, "before the actual elevation of the membrane, some cortical change beginning at the point of sperm entry sweeps over
the egg immunizing it to other sperms; the direct opposite pole of the site of
sperm entry is the last point affected." This cortical change precedes the actual beginning of membrane lifting, because "before the membrane begins
lifting at the site of sperm entry, sperm can no longer enter at any point of the
egg." Only afterwards does one see the formation of the fertilization membrane, starting at the point of sperm entry. Just had observed what are now
referred to as the fast and slow blocks to polyspermy, and he interpreted them
as such. His interpretation is particularly significant in that he repeated the
assertion that "the membrane is merely the sign and consequence of more
profound cortical changes." 5 6
In the second paper of 1919, Just gave support to Lillie's fertilizin hypothesis by showing that the ability of sea urchin eggs in the water to agglutinate sperm (presumably by fertilizin) correlated with the fertilizability of the
eggs. This fertilizin theory was important to Just because one of the bases of
Lillie's model was that "fertilizin is located in the cortex of the egg." 5 7 These
two papers of 1919 give the impression that Just championed the cortex even
more than he championed fertilizin. The fertilizin model was worthwhile
solely because it showed the importance of the cortical cytoplasm, and not the
converse.
From this point until 1931, Just played many variations on this same
theme, stressing the responsiveness of the cortical cytoplasm. He could readily turn a research report into a polemic, and did so in 1929, in reply to a series
of investigations by R. Chambers. After questioning the validity of Chambers's data by showing how he had used improperly prepared eggs, Just gave
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his own description of the minute, delicate filaments in the cortical cytoplasm
of echinoderm eggs. Just then passed from data to propaganda.
The reactivity of the cell as a whole—its individual and peculiar response
to stimulation with attendant measurable physical and chemical changes—
is largely, if indeed not wholly, a cortical (ectoplasmic) phenomenon.
Cortical changes in ova are, therefore, no mere epiphenomena: they constitute the sine qua non of cellular life. In responding to and propagating
the effects of the initial event in the fertilization-reaction, the attachment
of the spermatozoon, the egg exhibits cortical changes which eventually
modify the whole protoplasm and direct the course of ontogeny. 58
In The Biology of the Cell Surface, Just referred to these strands in an
important statement where various metaphors of the cell cortex (ectoplasm)
are contrasted.
All these considerations and data indicate that the surface-cytoplasm cannot be thought of as inert or apart from the living cell-substance. The
ectoplasm is more than a barrier to stem the rising tide within the active
cell-substance; it is more than a dam against the outside world. It is a
living mobile part of the cell. It reacts upon and with the inner substance
and in turn the inner substance reacts upon and with it. It is not only a
series of mouths, gateways. The waves of protoplasmic activity rise to
heights and shape the surface anew. Without, the environment plays upon
the ectoplasm and its delicate filaments as a player upon the strings of a
harp, giving them new forms and calling forth new melodies. But these
are too nice for the undiscriminating ear of man. 59
For Just, the sperm triggered the egg to develop but did not play a major
role afterwards. It was merely the finger that plucked a well-tuned string to
call forth a resonance. This idea is also expressed in his analysis of Kruger's
observation that in the Rhabditis egg the sperm activated the egg to develop
but remained inert afterwards, never uniting with the egg nucleus. That sperm
was not essential for development was further shown by parthenogenesis, in
which development is initiated by artificial means. The analysis of artificial
parthenogenesis was a major thrust of Just's research program from 1919 to
1930, as it enabled him to look specifically at the cortical cytoplasm reaction
system that began development. Just saw a "rhythmical movement of water"
causing regional dehydration in portions of the egg and concluded that the
sperm or parthenogenetic agents first caused a dehydration of the cortex,
which subsequently dehydrated the cytoplasmic ground substance, which
thereby brought about mitosis. It is this reallocation of cortical water that he
believed brought about development.
When parthenogenetic agents displaced water from the cortex, development ensued. Just discovered that one of the agents capable of causing this
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response was ultraviolet irradiation. As early as 1926, Just had observed that
Nereis eggs exposed to ultraviolet light developed abnormally. Moreover,
many of these abnormal embryos showed a localized defect, "which is traced
back to the site of cortical injury by radiation." 60 It is not surprising, then,
that as late as 1932 Just thought he had turned the tables on the geneticists,
dismissing radiation-induced mutations as mere epiphenomena of the real site
of injury—the cell cortex. "Normal chromosome distribution and combinations depend upon the integrity of the cortex; their aberrant behavior is
the effect of the loss of this integrity. . . . This would mean, therefore, that
chromosome-behavior is not a primary one, but rather the expression of the
ectoplasmic reactions." 61
Thus, Just contended that mutations were the result of cortical disruption
and not of direct injury to chromatin. This concept is extremely important, for
it shows that for Just, genetics was subservient to development (or similarly,
that the nucleus is subservient to the cytoplasm). A mutation is not a defect in
a gene, but a defect in the cortical cytoplasm that directs development. Starting at this point, Just could speculate as to how genetics and embryology are
related. His first such speculations are in this article analyzing mutation. He
returned to Boveri's original experiments on dispermie eggs, "as a possible
starting-point from which we may begin an attempt at the union, nowadays
seemingly hopeless, of genetics and the physiology of development." Just interpreted Boveri's data to show that the aberrant chromosomal arrangements
were possible only because of the "weakened conditions in the cytoplasm
which make dispermy possible." After this, Just put forth his view (hearkening back to Driesch) that the cell is a system wherein nucleus and cytoplasm
reciprocally interact with one another." 62
Just believed that the nucleus and its chromosomes are normal cellular
structures that are constructed de novo from cytoplasmic stuff after each
mitosis. But Just claimed that some relationship clearly had to exist between
genetics and embryology "since heredity is expressed during the process of
development." Because the geneticists had failed to unite the two, a new theory was required. Just's theory is an inverted Weismannism wherein all the
hereditary potentials for development exist in the cytoplasm of the fertilized
egg. However, these potencies are all in an inhibited state. The nucleus exists
to absorb these inhibitors from the cytoplasm differently in each cell. "Genetic restriction then depends upon the removal by the nucleus of certain materials from the cytoplasm, leaving others free. The free materials determine
the character of the cell. . . . With each cleavage each nucleus fixes all material other than that which makes the blastomere what it is. The potencies for
embryo-formation are all present in the uncleaved egg." 6 3
There is a genetically based progressive restriction in potency as the nuclear chromosomes absorb the various agents of differentiation. "Thus, finally, every cell in the most complex organism has in its nucleus all the
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potencies except that one in the cytoplasm that makes the cell specific." In the
germ cells, these potencies would be released by the chromosomes. In an extremely important statement, Just declared, "Every cell in an organism becomes what it is because its cytoplasm has free its particular potencies whilst
the nucleus binds all others. These latter would, if left unbound in the cytoplasm, act as obstacles to the display of special potencies." 64
The chromosomes are constructed of the unused substances that would
have caused the cell to differentiate in another fashion. For Just, the nucleus
was not the throne room of the cell; it was its refuse dump, a necessary, but far
from noble, position.
Science is a creative human product, and scientific writings, like music,
art, and literature, are historical artifacts. Looking at Just's scientific work in
its historical context allows us to see two hidden agenda contained therein.
The first concerns the relationship between embryology and genetics. Just
viewed "differentiation and heredity as merely two expressions of development." 6 5 Genetics was thought to be subservient to embryology, just as the
nucleus was seen to be formed from and be subservient to the potencies of the
cytoplasm. In Just's model, the cytoplasm is where the answer to heredity and
differentiation is to be found, not in the nucleus. In this newly synthesized
field, the embryologists travel the straight and noble path.
Another hidden agendum concerns government. The developing organism
is a polity of interacting cells, and each cell contains a nucleus and cytoplasm.
The way that Just expressed the genetic regulation between these cellular elements is fascinating. In effect, Just postulated a noble cytoplasmic populace
that contained all the potencies needed for the body or body politic. The nucleus acted to withdraw certain "obstacles" from the cytoplasm such that a
specific potential could be expressed. In another cell, this obstacle is itself a
specific potential. Thus, the nucleus, the central government of the cell,
allows the expression of cytoplasmic potential by suppressing other possible
potentials. This view reflects a specific solution to a problem that was being
debated at that time by black scholars. The 1930s was the era of black migration from the South to the North and of the ensuing ethnic battles in the cities
they entered. (In 1935, the Herald Tribune claimed that a second ItaloEthiopian War was being fought in the streets of New York City.) It was the
era of Langston Hughes and Richard Wright. Blacks had their potentials, too,
but could only express them if other potentials/obstacles were removed. The
Harlem Renaissance before the Depression showed how great those potentials
could be when realized. The use by Just of the word "obstacle" instead of the
more technical word "inhibitor" is instructive. The embryo—that ideal of organization—is modeled like an ideal society, a society that allows the optimal
expression of its constituents' potentials. Just never enjoyed political debates;
they bored him. Perhaps he already had an ideal society in mind and was trying desperately to bring that idea before the public. This ideal of government
was his cellular republic, and Just explicitly viewed the egg cell as a micro-
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cosm. Just knew that people tend to extrapolate from nature to politics, and he
felt that Kropotkin's mutual-aid hypothesis of evolution was a valid extrapolation of nature into human behavior. Moreover, "the means of cooperation and
adjustment is the ectoplasm," because the ectoplasmic cortex of the egg is
incorporated into the nervous system of adult vertebrates. 66 For Just, the agent
of evolution was not the nucleus, but the cortical cytoplasm, the marginalized
populace. Just viewed the cell and the embryo as perfectly balanced societies.
Within an embryo, each cell had a defined role. The type of cell it became was
determined by the cytoplasmic potentials remaining after the others were
locked away in the nucleus. All potentials were needed in a balanced social or
physical organism.
Just's federalism of the cell was a rebellion against contemporary views of
the Zellenstaat, which were more authoritarian, and was the cytological analogue of the "physiological democracy" of his friend W. C. Allee. 67 In viewing the embryo as a society where each cell is allowed to develop a particular
potential, Just saw a model of a society where each group of people could
express its potential once certain "obstacles" were removed. It was a federalism that allowed the minorities to express themselves in a local fashion and,
at the same time, contribute to the general welfare of the society. This was
precisely the urgent political question that was being addressed by the leading
black sociologists of Just's time. W. Ε. B. DuBois called it the problem of the
majority. "Granted that government should be based on the consent of the
governed, does the consent of a majority at any particular time adequately
express the consent of all? Has the minority, even though a small and unpopular and unfashionable minority, no right to respectful consideration?" 68
Indeed, DuBois inadvertently used an embryological metaphor when he
demanded that the majority must not crush the self-development of a minority
population. The goal of the American Negro, said DuBois, is "to be a coworker in the kingdom of culture, to escape both death and isolation, to husband and use his best powers and latent genius." 6 9 This was precisely the dialectic that the embryo had solved, groups of cells achieving self-development,
expressing their unique potential to the betterment of the organism. But there
was another, deeper parallel; for the cell itself had a government. The embryo
was a federal republic of its constituent cells, and each of the cells harbored
the potentials (as embryologists knew from Driesch's work) of every other
type of cell. According to Just, each embryonic cell was directed to create a
nucleus from its cytoplasmic material. These materials were the agents that
would express certain potentials, and they were inhibited from so doing by
being kept in the nucleus. Only one set of potentials could be expressed in any
cell. The nucleus did not give any orders to the cytoplasm. Rather, the order
was coming from the entire embryo. As Driesch had shown, the community
of cells together determined the fate of each individual cell. The cell was not
ruled by the nucleus; for that matter, it was not ruled by the cytoplasm either.
The cytoplasm was far more important than the nucleus, to be sure, as it con-
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tained the developmental potentials and reacted with other cells and with the
external environment; but the total community of embryonic cells is what determined the fate of a particular cell.
The development of an organism is a history of its cellular interaction.
Therefore, to Just, development was a property of the cytoplasm; for only the
cytoplasm could respond. The most responsive part of the cytoplasm—as Just
showed from fertilization studies—is the cell cortex, the outermost cytoplasmic rim. It is this peripheral rim of material that Just championed as the
prime mover of development, evolution, and intelligence. Whereas the mainstream of cellular biologists believed and assumed that the cytoplasm took its
instructions from the central nucleus, Just believed in the primacy of the cortex. I believe further that he made some psychological self-identification with
the object of his meticulous observations. He thought the peripheral rim
of cytoplasm beautiful, sensitive, creative, powerful, important, and disregarded. In short, his view of the cortex mirrored his view of the black in
American society. As we will see later, the heroes of his book are both the cell
surface and himself. By championing the cause of the cortex, he subtly championed his own.™
There is excellent scientific argument in the works of E. E. Just. But there
is more. There is a professional polemic designed to prevent his profession
from falling into the hands of geneticists, and there is a political model of a
federal republic that would recognize the potentials of his race. The three
agenda are never far apart, and each one informs the other. What is particularly fascinating is that the same mixture of science, professionalization, and
cytopolitics is found in the work of Just's geneticist contemporary, Richard
Goldschmidt.

The Nuclear Aristocracy of Richard Goldschmidt
Physiological Genetics (1938) was Goldschmidt's attempt to reduce embryology to a subset of genetics. On the very first page of this volume, he
redefined heredity to include "the mechanism of heredity," which he called
"static genetics," and the "problem of development" which he called "dynamic genetics." Proclaiming that "development is to be linked specifically
with the function and action of the gene," he preferred to call the latter study
"physiological genetics." This part of genetics, wrote Goldschmidt, "was
practically banned from advanced treatises and textbooks of genetics, and the
opinion has developed and has even been voiced that it is not worth while to
mention a field in which nothing is known with certainty." Goldschmidt admitted that "we know next to nothing of the action of the heredity material in
controlling development," but he continued that he would now "present the
entire material available." 71

Cellular Politics

335

Because Goldschmidt saw development as an epiphenomenon of gene activity, even the most complex patterns of embryonic ontogeny were seen as
driven by genes. "Development is, of course, the orderly production of pattern, and therefore, after all, genes must control pattern." 72 Goldschmidt assumed that if a problem is developmental, then it is in essence a genetic
problem.
Goldschmidt then looked at the mechanisms by which the nucleus controlled development and offered two propositions—the first on the role of
timing in gene activation and the second on the developmental inefficacy of
the cytoplasm. The temporal basis of differentiation was one of the ideas that
Goldschmidt tried in vain to get other geneticists to accept. Embryologists
asked, "if all the genes in all the cell nuclei were the same, how can the genes
control development?" Goldschmidt answered that the timing of gene activity
was crucial. "The genes controlling pattern act by producing definite reactions of definite velocity." 73 Goldschmidt had analyzed a series of bizarre
mutations called homoeotic mutants. Here, the development of a particular
embryonic structure follows the development of another particular structure.
For example, Drosophila having the dominant mutation Aristapedia have
legs developing where their antennae should be. In some alleles of this locus,
part of the antenna is converted into a leg structure (such as a tarsus or
trochanter), whereas other alleles produce the entire transformation of antenna to leg. Goldschmidt analyzed these mutants and concluded that the aberrant development was not due to the elaboration of different materials by
different genes, but to the aberrant timing of gene activity. "Here, then, a
mutant gene changes an embryological process by shifting its initiation to a
different point in time." Small changes in timing could create complex morphological changes. 74
Goldschmidt looked at all genetic variations as changes in development.
To him, the study of wing patterns or eye pigmentation was just as much a
developmental problem as the development of the wing or eye themselves—
and more readily analyzed. Like Just, Goldschmidt wanted to study these processes with the least possible perturbation. Goldschmidt saw the analysis of
mutations as being superior in this respect to surgical manipulation.
But certain processes [of development] may be changed without deleterious consequences; and if this is done by genetic change, we call it a mutation. Such considerations, obvious as they may seem to be, make us
expect that the action of the mutated genes upon development cannot be of
a different type from any other changes of development induced by experimental agencies; in both cases, something changes the detailed course of
some developmental processes.
As evidence of this, Goldschmidt brought forth his data on phenocopies,
organisms where experimentally produced abnormalities mimic certain mu-
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tants of the untreated organism. He provided numerous examples of temperature altering the pigment pattern of one race of butterflies in such a way as to
make it resemble that of another. By relating the timing of heat shocks to the
developmental pattern and by correlating the timing of eye color formation in
various mutations with the time at which that color first develops, Goldschmidt concluded that "the mutant gene produces its effect, the difference
from the wild-type, by changing the rates of the partial processes of development." 75 He was to use this principle of timing not only to explain mutations,
homoeosis, and phenocopies, but also morphogenetic patterns and embryonic
induction. In all these instances, development is reduced to being an epiphenomenon of genetics.
But there was other evidence as well. In 1934, J. Hämmerling had published his remarkable observations upon the development of Acetabularia.16
These experiments (which Just ignored in his book) were critical in convincing biologists of the developmental importance of the nucleus. Hämmerling had shown that the nucleus of this unicellular protist controls the
morphogenesis of its complex cap. Moreover, if the nucleus of one species
were transplanted into a decapitated stem of another species, that stalk would
regenerate a cap characteristic of the nuclear donor. To Goldschmidt, "this
shows that actually the genes within the nucleus control the production of specific formative stuffs (not unspecific as in the hormonic type) which diffuses
through the cytoplasm to the place of its form-controlling function." He saw
this as "forging an interesting link between genetics and experimental embryology" and observed that it demonstrates "that such processes of distribution and arrangement of cytoplasmic components occur under control
of genes." 7 7
Goldschmidt thus saw genes as controlling the production and distribution
of cytoplasmic materials, but he did not see the cytoplasm as controlling the
nucleus. That reciprocal relationship, alluded to in the earlier discussion of
the views of Morgan and Driesch, had been abandoned by Goldschmidt and
Just. Whereas Just made the relationship vectoral, with the cytoplasm influencing the nucleus only, for Goldschmidt the nucleus influenced the cytoplasm, and the cytoplasm did as the nucleus demanded.
In Goldschmidt's model of the embryonic cell, the cytoplasm is the substratum upon which the genes act. It is not, itself, active. In all cases, the
cytoplasm was considered to be the substratum on which the genes work, although the processes within the cytoplasm may take this independent course
once started by the action of the genes. The word substratum is well chosen,
for it not only denotes the background on which genes act, but it also connotes
an enzymatic property as well. Genes act on the substratum-cytoplasm as enzymes act on substrates. The activation of the gene, then, is merely the preparation of the substrate. In the dividing egg, "one substratum is transformed
into two or more different ones, which now provide the proper substratum for

Cellular Politics

337

the activation of new genes." This process does not necessarily mean that
some new cytoplasmic stuff feeds back into the nucleus to activate a specific
gene. Rather, Goldschmidt's cytoplasmic "preparations" for gene activity include alterations of pH, temperature, and the presence of correct cofactors—
precisely those elements that allow enzymes to react on substrates. The
cytoplasm, then, exists to be modified by the action of the nucleus. It is a
series of substrates to be acted upon by the gene-enzyme agents derived from
the nucleus. "Thus we conclude that the cytoplasm is mainly the substratum
for genie action, in which all those decisive processes take place which constitute development and which are steered by the genes." 7 8
In Goldschmidt's model, the cytoplasm carries no potentials. It is impotent and subservient, a far cry from the potent, active cytoplasm proposed by
Just; and its passivity is equally political. Goldschmidt's book can also be read
as science, as professional polemic, and as Utopian fantasy. Goldschmidt was
the head of a genetics department and a firm believer in the reducibility of all
developmental problems to genetic ones. Were genetics and embryology to be
reunited, the geneticists would control the field. The relationship between nucleus and cytoplasm parallels that of geneticist and embryologist.
There is a political element here, as well. Goldschmidt viewed the cell as
a monarchy run by the nucleus. This analogy was not peculiar to Goldschmidt. One finds it in other German biologists, and it is explicit in the work
of Goldschmidt's advisor, Richard Hertwig. Writing on "Die Protozoen und
die Zelltheorie" in the first article of the Archiv für Protistenkunde, Hertwig
states that "I would like to compare the one-nucleus cell to an absolute monarchy; the achievements of such a political system result from the mass of
people, the directives from monarch." 7 9 Hertwig compared multinucleated
cells with oligarchies, emphasizing that the nucleus always gives directives
such that "nothing would change in the unitedness of a political system, even
if the 'oligarchs' allowed a division of labor to enter the leading roles."
This view of the nobility of the nucleus was agreeable to Goldschmidt's
view of both himself and science. Richard Goldschmidt strove for a noble life.
He considered himself an aristocrat, a self-aware king in the scientific world
of interbellum Germany. Goldschmidt felt that artists and scientists were the
truly free individuals, persons whose creative talents were responsible to no
one. Indeed, the scientist and the artist were merged in Goldschmidt's personality. When Goldschmidt met Segovia in Japan, the latter gave him a personal
concert. "Only kings used to be able to have such an experience." This ability
to "create without outside interference or control" gave the scientist the royal
duties of noblesse oblige. 80
Goldschmidt as head of the genetics division of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute, a world-famous lecturer, art collector and critic, music connoisseur,
and founder of journals, prized excellence. In his autobiography, his favorite
most highly prized adjective is "noble." This word referred to spiritual rather
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than to worldly excellence, and he used it to describe individuals such as his
father, nursemaid, or best childhood friend who had lived lives of hardship. 81
This nobility of spirit is stressed by those individuals who remember Goldschmidt well.
Goldschmidt shocked his contemporaries by attributing this nobility to his
Jewish background, and he began his autobiography with a mythic pedigree
that emphasized his Jewishness.
I come from an old German-Jewish family. This fact may convey little
meaning to most people, for it is perhaps not generally known that the
German Jews are a group of people who can trace their origin, at least in a
general way, farther back into gray antiquity than the oldest known family, the K'ung (Confucius) in China. The reason this can be done is that
many German-Jewish families, like my own, belong to the caste of the
Levites, the literary and teaching caste since Moses' time some three
thousand years ago. The Levites kept to themselves through the centuries
except for intermarriage with the priestly caste, the Cohens, and thus the
members of the Levite caste are the product of an age-long selection of
intellectual performance. . . . When the Romans had conquered Germany and erected the Limes Germanicus, the fortified frontier against the
barbarians, Roman Jews of Levite families were settled along the Limes to
teach the savage Teutons the amenities of Mediterranean agriculture. 82
This is a truly royal pedigree wherein Goldschmidt claimed that he was not
merely the fortuitous product of German high culture; rather, he was one
whose ancestors created it, instructing the barbaric tribes in the ways of civilization. Moreover, Goldschmidt saw himself as the culmination of centuries
of selective breeding for high intelligence. He returned to this idea later when
he reflected upon a poster that the Nazis had circulated which showed all the
positions of authority occupied by the Goldschmidt family. "I think that
the Nazi poster could well be used as a chart demonstrating the effect of
long selection of favorable hereditary traits upon the improvement of human
families." 8 3
Kingship metaphors abound in Goldschmidt's writing. One of the most
revealing is Goldschmidt's rationale for expanding genetics into embryology,
for it depicts an active genetics and a passive embryology. The latter was represented as tillable land: "geneticists will continue to worry about the problem
of genetic action and take the risk of climbing over the fence erected by some
jealous embryologists, who, while claiming the kingdom for themselves, do
not set out to till its soil." 84
Goldschmidt considered himself an aristocrat of the spirit. At the same
time, he had good reason to fear the proletariat, for he had been a victim of
two instances of mass hysteria. In 1918, while at Yale, Goldschmidt was arrested as "an extremely dangerous German" and was sent, under armed
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guard, to an internment camp in Georgia. Although he blamed the war-fever
on the Justice Department and popular press, he found that the American public was only too willing to become a hateful mob. His supporters had to fear
mob violence and personal attacks, said Goldschmidt, and "their noble actions brought many unpleasant experiences upon them during the following
year." 85 He also recounted the servility and readiness with which the German
people accepted Hitler, and related how nobody protested the mass murders
and how one widow quietly accepted her husband's death. Decent people, he
reflected, are capable of the most horrible atrocities. To Goldschmidt, there is
no inherent nobility in the great masses of people, and most of them will do
whatever is in accord with popular fashion. They are not in control of their
own destiny or even, it would seem, of their own behavior. If their leaders say
it is permissible to murder, they do not protest. If the leaders wish to intern an
individual away from his family, so be it. Goldschmidt had little respect for
the masses, but he had enormous respect for those noble individuals who
could rise above popular prejudices.
Such an ideology is reflected in Goldschmidt's cell. The world of nature is
harmonious, and Goldschmidt gloried throughout his autobiography on the
bountiful beauty of nature. Likewise, the cell is a marvel of harmonious function. To Goldschmidt, the nucleus was the repository of the hereditary traits.
As an intellectual aristocracy passed cultural traditions to a society, so the genes
expressed their inherited potentials to the cell. The cytoplasm merely allowed
these traits to be expressed. All the important elements in the cell were nuclear;
the cytoplasm was merely a substrate. According to Goldschmidt, development
was based on the harmonious reaction system comprised of all the genes.
These genes were also enzymes, and they accomplished their cytoplasmic catalyses according to the law of mass action. In the case of the embryo, the
nucleus acted as the enlightened monarch should, creating a well balanced cell
that performed its proper function. In mutants, the monarch was less enlightened, and the instructions to the cytoplasm could cause the death of the
cell or even the death or malformation of the entire organism. But sometimes,
a mutation could arise that might change the fate of a cell to something even
better. This was Goldschmidt's view of evolution and it was based on nuclear
homoeotic mutations. While Just viewed evolution as the product of the cell
cortex, Goldschmidt viewed evolution as being controlled totally by nuclear
changes.

Epilogue: The Cell As Text
We know cells only through interpretation. Nobody has knowledge of the cellular structure and function except through technical (stains, microscopy) or
literary devices (textbooks, articles). Just and Goldschmidt each interpreted
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cells in different ways and for different reasons. The creative interpretation of
the cell can be seen in what is left out as well as what is included in their
respective discussions. Just, for instance, never used the term "segregation"
in his book even though it was widely used by his colleagues and was, in fact,
Lillie's paradigm for early embryonic development. Just also did not discuss
Hämmerling's Acetabularia experiments, although they were well publicized.
These experiments would not fit his cytoplasmic model. Similarly, we see
Goldschmidt 's varied interpretation of the cell in his description of Morgan's
theory of the gene as being "dead as the dodo" and his interpretation of Hämmerling's experiments in terms of nuclear dominance.
Landau has shown how scientists often use narrative structure in their
texts to make political stories out of their data.86 This is certainly true of Just
and Goldschmidt. Just casts his book within two narratives. The first is the
"Ugly Duckling" story wherein the despised character is belatedly recognized as the most treasured. The hero of this tale is alternately the cell surface
and Just himself, the unrecognized genius. The second narrative is the "Emperor's New Clothes" wherein Just is seen as having the keen eyes, unclouded
judgment, and personal integrity to shout that the genetic theory of mutations
and development is a sham. Goldschmidt's narrative is more subtle, yet is just
as pervasive. The reader of Physiological Genetics cannot help but see Goldschmidt's pioneering work described on nearly every page. He refers to "the
gene of tomorrow" and to "tomorrow's theory of the germ plasm." He even
discusses the chemistry of chromosome replication, but then says, "I shall not
develop further this idea, to which I think the future belongs." 87 Goldschmidt
portrayed himself as leader and prophet. Like Moses, he could lead people to
the promised land, but he could not enter it himself. The American geneticists
were given an opportunity to travel with him.
The Americans rejected it. They rejected both Just's and Goldschmidt's
work as irrelevant. At the same time that Just and Goldschmidt published their
syntheses, the British biologist Waddington published his own synthetic
scheme, Organisers and Genes. This book reflected the dialectical Whiteheadian views of its author, who saw the nucleus and cytoplasm (and genetics and
embryology) as mutually interacting partners. Moreover, neither genetics nor
embryology was seen as sufficient to explain development. "A coherent theory of development cannot be founded on the known properties of genes. . . .
No stimulus, nor single cause is itself an adequate explanation of anything." 88
Waddington attempted to show that the geneticist's genes were the same
as the embryologist's organizers. Although the attempt proved problematic, it
led to a rapprochement between genetics and embryology. Each discipline explained part of development and neither could subsume the other. Thus, each
could pursue its own program of research. The truce fit the American setting
where the newly organized science of genetics was finding research funds and
backing from sources quite separate from those of embryology (see Paul and
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Kimmelman, this volume). While American embryology continued to have its
roots in a European context, genetics had become a markedly different science
and had separated itself from its European parentage.
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